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The article introduces a set of remedial conditions that might justify unilateral secession
under international public law and examines whether remedial secession might be
applied in the post-Soviet “frozen conﬂicts”: South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh,
Transdniestria and Crimea. The article concludes that the remedial right to secession has
no relevance in the “frozen conﬂicts” in post-Soviet region and neither of the entities
cannot justify their independence on remedial secession. However, all the cases conﬁrm
the existence of the right and its conditions. Moreover, the situations of the “frozen
conﬂicts” in the post-Soviet region add clarity to the procedural criterion for the exercise
of the negotiations. Negotiations in good faith are possible merely if the conﬂicting parties
are not inﬂuenced by the third states, which violate international law. The cases of South
Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transdniestria and Crimea reveal that the right to
remedial secession simply is not relevant in the cases which are related to the unlawful
use of force or other egregious violations of the norms of international law. Remedial
secession cannot be exercised in the cases, created in serious breach of international
law norms.
& 2015 Mykolas Romeris University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All right
reserved. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The secession attempts of Kosovo, South Ossetia1 and Abkhazia in 2008 put the questions of state sovereignty and self-
determination at the top of the international agenda and triggered debates among academics on the applicability of the
right to self-determination, including the right to secession (Tancredi, 2008; Müllerson, 2009; Slomanson, 2009; Borgen,
2009‒2010). Self-determination and secession constitute the core issues of international public law (hereinafter referred to
as ‘international law’). Peoples and groups in many parts of the world assert the right to self-determination and even
secession, which conﬂicts with the respective states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity (Walter and Ungern-Sternberg,
2014, p. 1). All the above-mentioned cases – Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia – represent a possible clash of self-
determination and territorial integrity. Yet, it is argued that the right of states to territorial integrity might not be absolute
and unqualiﬁed, as “the development of international human rights law has in many respects limited the concept of stateuction and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All right reserved. This is an open access article under the CC BY-
/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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conditions that might justify the secession of a subgroup from its parent state as a “remedy of last resort”.
The doctrine of remedial secession was invoked by many states that recognised Kosovo (Bolton, 2013, p. 109). Similarly, the
Russian Federation adopted the language of remedial secession to justify its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia after the
end of the RussiaGeorgia war.2 To date, South Ossetia and Abkhazia de jure remain a part of Georgia, though Georgia does not
have any effective control over these self-proclaimed republics. South Ossetia, Abkhazia, as well as Transdniestria in Moldova3
and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan4 are considered as “frozen conﬂicts” in the post-Soviet region.
From the perspective of political science, the conﬂicts are labelled as “frozen conﬂicts” which signiﬁes that although the
military hostilities have stopped, the solutions to the roots of these conﬂicts have not been found (Walter, 2014, p. 295). The term
“frozen conﬂict” means a stalemate, which may occur due to military, political, economic or other factors (Walter, 2014, p. 295).
From the perspective of international law, “frozen conﬂicts” indicate competing sovereignty claims over a particular territory and
a possible clash of different international law norms, in which a subgroup refers to the right of self-determination of peoples,
whereas the parent state urges on respect for the territorial integrity of states. Therefore, as in the cases of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh also claim that they are not only entitled to self-determination, but to secession,
and they base their claim on charges of discrimination and massive human rights violations committed by their parent states
(Walter and Ungern-Sternberg, 2014, p. 2), which form the basis of the right to remedial secession.
The legal aspects of self-determination and secession have been propelled to new heights in international politics by the
2014 Ukrainian crisis (Walter, 2014, p. 295). On March 16th of 2014, a referendumwas held, in which Crimea voted in favour
of joining the Russian Federation (Crimea exit poll: About 93% back Russia union, 2014; ). The international community
underscored the referendum as having no validity and violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.5 Despite
the international condemnation and warnings (Crimea crisis: foreign leaders condemn ‘Russia’s destabilising actions’ as 93%
vote in referendum for secession, 2014; Ukraine crisis: ‘Illegal’ Crimean referendum condemned, 2014; The Brussels G7
Summit Declaration, 2014, p. 8), the Russian Federation recognised the independence of Crimea (Декларация о
независимости Автономной Республики Крым и г.Севастополя, 2014) and, following the results of the refer-
endum, a treaty of the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation was signed (President Putin signs treaty to bring
Crimea into Russia, 2014). While justifying its actions, Russia, as well as in the cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, referred
to self-determination and Kosovo’s example.
The Crimean crisis, considered as a new “frozen conﬂict” in the post-Soviet region (“A Strong NATO in a Changed World”
Speech by NATO Secretary General Andres Fogh Rasmussen at the “Brussels Forum”, 2014), heightened concerns about the
unresolved conﬂicts, as they are all potentially explosive and dangerous. The illegal referendum and the subsequent annexation of
Crimea by the Russian Federation also revealed the importance of the proper understanding and application of the right to self-
determination, including remedial secession. If misapplied or distorted, self-determination might threaten international peace
and security, and lead to the fragmentation of states. In this regard, H. F. E. Whitlam aptly noted that “[i]deas might be used as
weapons… as a weapon ‘self-determination’ should be handled with care” (Summers, 2007, p. 9). Therefore, this article intro-
duces a set of remedial conditions that might justify unilateral secession. A particular amount of attention is paid to the Kosovo
case, which is referred to as a precedent for the secessionist claims. The article also examines whether remedial secession might
be applied in the post-Soviet “frozen conﬂicts”. The applicability of the remedial right to secession in the mentioned conﬂicts
might also reveal or rebut the existence of the right, as well as its conditions.2. The right to remedial secession and its conditions
State and judicial practice supports the existence of the right to remedial secession and reveals a set of conditions that have to be
met prior the exercise of the right. Remedial secessionwas supported by some of the judicial bodies (Katangese Peoples’ Congress v.
Zaire, 1994; Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996). Perhaps the most prominent and cited judicial decision, which dealt with the unilateral
secession of a part of the population, was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada.6 The Canadian Supreme Court was asked to
issue a decision whether Quebec had the right to secede from Canada and if so, under what circumstances. In its decision, adopted
in 1998, the Court summarised its ﬁndings, indicating that international law “at best” generates the right to external self-2 An armed conﬂict took place in August 2008 between Georgia on one side, and the Russian Federation and the separatist South and Abkhazia on the
other. The conﬂict is also known as the Russia-Georgia, the 2008 South Ossetia war, the Five-Day war and the August war.
3 The latter is also known as Transnistria and Trans-Dniestr. After the proclamation of independence, Transdniestria purported to create Pridnestrovian
Moldovian Republic (also known as Pridnestrovie).
4 In Russian, “Nagorno” means “mountainous”, whereas the word “Karabakh” is a Turkish-Persian fusion, most often translated as “black garden”.
Armenians name the region “Artsakh”, while Azerbaijanis refer to it as “Yukhari Karabakh” (“Upper Karabakh”). The region is also sometimes spelled as
Nagorno-Karabagh, Nagorny-Karabakh or Nagorny-Karabgh. The authors have chosen the spelling “Nagorno-Karabakh”, because it is used by the Orga-
nisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and in the international documents related to Nagorno-Karabahk. The choice does not endorse any
position.
5 General Assembly Resolution 68/262 supported the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and underscored the referendum as having no
validity (GA Resolution 68/262, 2014).
6 Some academics, while discussing remedial secession, merely refer to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada. For instance, Vidmar, 2010, p. 39;
The Lecture ‘Remedial Secession in South Caucasus’ by Professor W. Slomanson, 2012.
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political, economic, social and cultural development (Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998, § 126). In such a case, “o…4the
people in question are entitled to a right to external self-determination because they have been denied the ability to internally exert
their right to self-determination” (§ 138). At the same time, the Supreme Court of Canada observed that it is not clear whether the
proposition of the right to remedial secession reﬂects “an established international standard” (§ 135), though it did not examine this
question in detail, because the Quebecers were not the beneﬁciaries of the right. The Court concluded that the population of
Quebec was entitled to meaningful internal self-determination, as Canadawas a “sovereign and independent state conducting itself
in compliance with the principle of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a government
representing all the people belonging to the territory without distinction” (§ 136, § 154). In other words, the Supreme Court of
Canada applied the typical a contrario reasoning of the safeguard clause and acknowledged the right to secession, conditioned on
non-respect of internal self-determination.
The most recent judicial opinion is on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Inde-
pendence in Respect of Kosovo (2010) (‘Advisory Opinion’ or ‘Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’). The Court was asked to render
an opinion on whether the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of
Kosovo was in Accordance with International law (§ 1, p. 5). The ICJ conﬁned itself to examining whether the Declaration of
Independence was prohibited either under general international law or under the Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) (§
49‒56, p. 19‒21). It concluded that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence did not violate international law, because inter-
national law contained no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence (§ 84, p. 32).
Given the manner in which the Court interpreted the question of the General Assembly, the Court did not analyse the
scope and content of contemporary self-determination, including remedial secession. It considered that the question of
whether Kosovo had the right to declare its independence by virtue of the right to self-determination and the existence of
the right to remedial secession were beyond the scope of the case (§ 82‒83, p. 31). In regard to the right to remedial
secession, the ICJ simply noted that “radically different views” were expressed on whether “o…4the international law
confers upon part of the population of an existing State a right to separate from that State o… 4” (§ 82, p. 31). In addition,
it observed that “[s]imilar differences existed regarding whether international law provides for a right of “remedial
secession” and, if so, in what circumstances” (§ 82, p. 31). The Court was highly criticised for the missed opportunity to shed
more light on the right to self-determination not only by academics (Cerone, 2010; Mills, 2011; Burri, 2010; Hannum, 2011),
but also by the judges of the ICJ.7 The authors agree with the expressed criticism, though at the same time, ﬁnd that the
Advisory Opinion is important for several reasons.
Firstly, it is clear that the Court neither closed the doors for remedial secession nor denied the existence of remedial
secession as, for instance, de lege ferenda or, as a regional customary rule. On the contrary, it might be argued that the
remedial secession theory was indirectly supported by the ICJ. It maintained that the scope of the principle of territorial
integrity was conﬁned to the sphere of relations between states (§ 80, p. 30), which implies that the ICJ excluded territorial
integrity as an obstacle prohibiting the right to secession of a subgroup (Laurinavičiūtė, 2014, p. 179). Secondly, the Court
reafﬁrmed that secession per se is not illegal, though the illegality of unilateral declarations (those aimed at seceding) stems
not from the unilateral character of these declarations, but from the fact “o…4that they were, or would have been,
connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular
those of a peremptory character (jus cogens)” (§ 81, p. 38). In other words, the general principle of law ex injuria non oritur
jus, applicable in international law, allows drawing the conclusion that even effective territorial situations, created in breach
of jus cogens8, will not be recognised as having legal effect.9 Therefore, the ICJ conﬁrmed that the legal basis in the process of
the creation of states is of great importance.
Thirdly, the judges of the ICJ, A. A. Canado Trindade and A. A. Yusuf, accepted the right to external self-determination in a
case when a group is subjected to systematic repression, crimes against humanity, persecution, discrimination or tyranny by
its parent state (Separate Opinion of Judge Yusuf, § 7‒9, p. 3; Separate Opinion of Judge A. A. Canado Trindade, § 173‒176, p.
53). Moreover, the written and oral positions of the states, submitted during the proceedings at the ICJ, are indicative of the
opinio juris of the states towards remedial secession. Of the 43 states, 17 states recognised or did not rule out the existence of
the right to remedial secession.107 For instance, the judge A. A. Yusuf stated that “[t]he Court had a unique opportunity to assess o…4the legal conditions to be met for such a right of
self-determination [the right to remedial secession] to materialize and give legitimacy to a claim for separation.” Separate Opinion of Judge Yusuf, 2010, §
17, p. 5.
8 Article 40 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts states that (it) stipulates the
existence of the so-called peremptory norms of general international law which are also known as jus cogens norms. According to the Commentary on
Article 41 by the International Law Commission on Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, for instance, self-determination
and the prohibition of the threat or use of force may be considered as jus cogens norms. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts with commentaries, 2001, p. 112‒116.
9 For instance, the effective territorial regime of Southern Rhodesia was condemned as illegal and created in breach of self-determination. See GA
Resolution 2024 (XX), 1965; SC Resolution 216, 1965; SC Resolution 217, 1965; SC Resolution 277, 1970.
10 Germany, Estonia, Albania, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Switzerland, Finland, Denmark, the Maldives, Croatia, the Russian Federation,
Romania, Estonia, Belarus, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. It should be observed that not all the states used the terms “remedial secession” or “the
right to remedial secession”, though they either referred to the Paragraph 7 of the Principle V of the Friendly Relations Declaration, either relied on the
conditions of the right to remedial secession or employed arguments resembling remedial secession. The Russian Federation, Romania and Belarus
expressed doubts about whether the right to remedial secession was ﬁrmly established in international law.
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subgroups within a state do not have an automatic right to unilateral secession even in cases of serious oppression. Instead,
according to the states, several conditions of must be satisﬁed prior to the exercise of the right to remedial secession. There
was an agreement on the need for severe, long-lasting refusal of internal self-determination and/or systematic, severe and
massive human rights violations11, as well as the absence of any viable remedy or feasible alternative to solve the conﬂict
(procedural condition). In other words, the right to secession must be an ultima ratio.12 All these conditions are well evident
in the Kosovo case which, according to the authors, might be considered as “o ... 4a cause celebre of the use of the
principle of self-determination in state-creation” (Economides, 2013, p. 824).
Before examining the above-mentioned conditions, it should be emphasised that a prior condition of the right to
remedial secession is that a subgroup must qualify as peoples for the purposes of the right to self-determination. The term
“subgroup” refers to a certain group of individuals, though not every group of individuals qualify as “peoples”. There should
exist “o ...4a collectivity as a distinct entity with certain group characteristics, which are non-reducible to the char-
acteristics of the composing individuals. Reformulated with regard to the issue of group identity, this amounts to saying that
the identity of the community has to go beyond the merely aggregated identities of the individual members” (Raič, 2002, p.
260). In other words, a mere community or association of people cannot be regarded as the holders of self-determination.
The distinctiveness of a subgroup refers to the composition of both objective and subjective criteria (Raič, 2002, p. 263).
As to the objective criteria, the UNESCO International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Concept of the Rights of
Peoples (‘UNESCO International Meeting of Experts’) suggested that an entity should possess some or all of the following
common features: common historical tradition, racial or ethnic identity, cultural homogeneity, linguistic unity, religious or
ideological afﬁnity, territorial connection, and common economic life. Moreover, the group must be of a certain number
which need not be large (e.g., the people of micro-states), and must also be more than a mere association of individuals
within a state (UNESCO International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Rights of Peoples, 1990, Final Report and
Recommendations, 1990, p. 7‒8). A similar approach towards the characteristics was taken by the International Commission
of Jurists, while analysing whether East Pakistanis might qualify as “peoples” (International Commission of Jurists, 1972).
Kosovo Albanians, a territorially concentrated minority group within Serbia, seemed to have met both the objective and
the subjective criteria of “peoples”. As to the objective criteria, Kosovo Albanians differed from Serbians and other groups
within Serbia. They possessed a common historical tradition, racial and ethnic identity, cultural homogeneity, linguistic
unity, religious and ideological afﬁnity, territorial connection, and common economic life. The criterion of the territorial
connection is often considered as a sine qua non condition for “peoplehood”, as it forms the background for the estab-
lishment and development of the clear identity of a subgroup. This criterion implies that a group of people must constitute a
clear majority within a particular territory (Murswiek, 1993, p. 23; Raič, 2002, p. 262).13 Kosovo Albanians constitute 90% of
the population of Kosovo.
As to the subjective criteria, the UNESCO International Meeting of Experts has stated that an entity “o…4as a whole
must have the will to be identiﬁed as a people or to be conscious of being a people o ... 4” (emphasis added) (UNESCO
International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Rights of Peoples, 1990, Final Report and Recommendations, 1990,
p. 8). The terms a people and a minority might sometimes overlap. As a minority usually has its own “kin” state, the
collective individuality means an identity by which it can be distinguished from those living in a “kin” state. Many mino-
rities usually “o…4cannot (apart from the geographical factor) and, indeed, do not wish to be distinguished from their
kith and kin residing in the kin state” (Raič, 2002, p. 269).
An overlap between a people and a minority might well be exempliﬁed by Kosovo Albanians. On one hand, Kosovo
Albanians share ethnic and other similarities with the majority of the population of Albania and constituted a minority
within Serbia. On the other hand, they constitute a numerical majority in Kosovo and have a well-established connection
with the territory. Moreover, throughout the years they have developed an identity which can be distinguished from
Albanian Albanians, therefore, it is submitted that they were a minority and a people at the same time (The Implementation
of the Right to Self-Determination as a Contribution to Conﬂict Prevention, 1998; Elsie, 2008; Ryngaert and Grifﬁoen, 2009,
p. 577; Laurinavičiūtė, 2014, p. 143‒148).
However, it should be highlighted that even if a subgroup qualiﬁes as peoples for the purposes of the right to self-
determination, it does not per se signify the entitlement to remedial secession. A minority group or a subgroup is primarily11 See Written Statement of Germany, p. 35; Written Statement of Estonia, § 2.1.1., p. 6‒9; Written Statement of Denmark, § 2.7, p. 12; Written
Statement of Finland, § 10, 12, p. 5, 7; Written Statement of Albania, § 75, 79, 86‒92, p. 40, 42, 44‒48; Written Statement of Ireland § 32, p. 10, § 33 iii, p 11;
Written Statement of the Netherlands, § 3.9‒3.13, p. 9‒11; Written Statement of Switzerland, § 81‒86, p. 21‒23; Written Statement of Poland, § 6.5, 6.10‒
6.12 p. 25‒27; Written Statement of Maldives, p.1; Written Statement of Slovenia p. 2/3; Croatia, see CR 2009/29 of 7 December 2009, § 13, p. 53, §43, p. 58,
§ 56‒61, p. 61‒62; the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, see CR 2009/31 of 9 December 2009, § 10, p. 29, § 24, p. 33, 38, p. 37; Written Statement of Romania, §
134, p. 39; Belarus, see CR 2009/27 of 3 December 2009; Written Statement of the Russian Federation, § 88, p. 31‒32.
12 Written Statement of Estonia, § 2.1.2., p. 9‒10; Written Statement of Poland, § 6.7, p. 10; Written Statement of Germany, p. 35; Written Statement of
Albania, § 93‒96; p. 48‒50; Written Statement of Switzerland, § 87‒96, p. 23‒26; Written Statement of the Netherlands, § 3.14, p. 11‒12; Written Statement
of Ireland, § 33 v., p. 11; for the position of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, see CR 2009/31 of 9 December 2009, § 38, p. 37; Written Statement of Finland,
§ 12, p. 7; Written Statement of Maldives, p. 1; Written Statement of Romania, § 139, p. 40‒41; Written Statement of the Russian Federation, § 88, p. 31‒32.
13 However, it is difﬁcult to give an indication of what constitutes a clear majority. Some assert that as the risk of creating a large minority in the newly
established State must be brought to a minimum, a majority of at least 80% would be required (see, for instance, Ryngaert, and Grifﬁoen, 2009, p. 577).
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a subgroup only when other conditions for the remedial secession are satisﬁed.
As to the second condition of the remedial secession, a subgroup must be subjected to a serious violation or denial of
internal self-determination that might be followed or be in combination with widespread, gross and persistent human
rights violations. Kosovo Albanians seem to have met the second condition, as they were denied internal self-determination
after the abolishment of autonomy in 1989 and were subjected to a decade of disproportionate mass violence.14 The
escalation of the violence in Kosovo turned into a humanitarian catastrophe and ended up with the NATO military
campaign.15
The criterion is also evident in the case of Bangladesh (East Pakistan). The events during the 1970's in Bangladesh
evolved into “o…4acts of repression and even possibly genocide, and caused ten million Bengalis to seek refuge in India”
(Crawford, 2006, p. 141). According to the various sources, over one million Bengalis were killed and some ten million East
Pakistani refugees ﬂed to India (International Commission of Jurists, 1972). On 17 April 1971, East Pakistan proclaimed its
independence “o…4 in due fulﬁlment of the right to self-determination of people of Bangladesh o… 4” (Bangladesh
Proclamation of Independence, 1971, 10 April 1971). The fact that the population of Bangladesh was subjected to an extreme
amount of violence played a signiﬁcant role in the international community's recognition of the legitimacy of the claim to
secession of Bangladesh (Raič, 2002, p. 341). In this regard, the cases of Kosovo and Bangladesh indicate that the claim for
secession does not arise in every case of oppression or discrimination, as the oppression must cross a certain threshold.
From the perspective of human rights law, it may sound very cynical, though the right to secession arises merely “o…4 if a
given human community suffers unbearable persecution o… 4” (Tomuschat, 1993, p. 1), thereby threatening the exter-
mination of such a community. This criterion is extremely important, as mass violence might be considered as an act
conferring a certain status to the victimised group.
Furthermore, all effective, available and realistic remedies for the settlement of the conﬂict must be exhausted and the
secession must be an ultimum remedium. In this sense, the example of Croatia is worth mentioning. For the ﬁrst time, Croatia
declared its independence from the Soviet Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 25 June 1991, which was reasserted on 8 October
1991. It seems tenable to share the opinion that Croatia's declaration of independence of 25 June 1991 seemed to be illegal,
because there were still other alternatives instead of secession and Croatia participated in the negotiations that led to the Brioni-
Accord (Raič, 2002, p. 361‒362). Only upon the failure of the negotiations, was secession used as a remedy of last resort.
This condition for remedial secession was also fulﬁlled by the Kosovo case, as after the establishment of an international
administration in Kosovo in 1999, Kosovo participated in the negotiation process on the future status for Kosovo. The
independence was declared only when the negotiation process ofﬁcially ended without results.16 The case of Kosovo reveals
the importance of the conduct of the parties during the negotiation process – the procedural criterion for the exercise of the
negotiations. The lack of good faith from the Serbian side was one of the factors that made successful negotiations
impossible and subsequently led to the unilateral secession of Kosovo.17 The conduct of the parties had inﬂuence on the
support of the international community for the claim to independence.18 This procedural criterion was also emphasised by
the Supreme Court of Canada in its decision Reference re Secession of Quebec (§ 151, § 153).3. The right to remedial secession and the “frozen conﬂicts”
South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transdniestria and Crimea are unsuccessful and widely unrecognised
secessions. Despite the attempts of the Russian Federation to justify the independence of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and
Crimea, employing the arguments of remedial secession and relying on “the Kosovo precedent created by our western
partners” (Address by President of the Russian Federation, 2014), such arguments did not convince the international
community. The independence of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Crimea gained little support.19 States condemned the14 The violations and their scale that took place in Kosovo are well documented not only by the UN bodies and non-governmental organisations, but
also by the laws of Serbia/Yugoslavia legalising discriminations towards ethnic Albanians. See, for instance, resolutions of the General Assembly of the UN:
UN Doc. A/Res/47/147, 1993, UN Doc. A/Res/49/204, 1994, UN Doc. A/Res/50/190, 1995, UN Doc. A/Res/52/139, 1997; reports of the Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia: UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-1/9, 1992, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/57, 1995, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/
107, 1996; the report of the Human Rights Watch: Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo, Human Rights Watch, 1998. See the list of the legislation in the
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1993/50, 1993, § 156‒159.
15 The NATO’s military campaign was justiﬁed on the necessity of averting “a massive humanitarian catastrophe”. See, for instance, The Situation in and
Around Kosovo, Statement Issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO headquarters, Brussels, on 12th April 1999.
16 The Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General, who led the negotiation process, stated that “o…4the negotiations’ potential to produce any
mutually agreeable outcome on Kosovo's status is exhausted. No amount of additional talks, whatever the format, will overcome this impasse”. See Report
of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo's future status, 2007, § 3. A similar conclusion was reached by the so-called Troika, comprising of
the EU, the Russian Federation and the United States. See Report of the European Union/United States/Russian Federation Troika on Kosovo, 2007, § 11, § 13.
17 See more in, for instance, Laurinavičiūtė (2014), p. 173‒174.
18 During the UN GA 22nd plenary meeting, the representative of the UK maintained that “Serbia complains about the unilateral declaration of Kosovo
in February 2008. But it was Serbia that, in a unilateral move of its own, rendered successful negotiations impossible. o… 4” (emphasis added). See UN Doc.
A/63/PV.22, 2008.
19 To date, Abkhazia and South Ossetia is recognised by the Russian Federation, Nicaragua, Venezuela and the Paciﬁc Island of Nauru. Crimea as a part
of the Russian Federation is recognised by Afghanistan, Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea, Syria and Russia.
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through the use of force” (UN Doc. S/PV.5969, 2008, p. 12; UN Doc. A/68/PV.80, 2014, p. 12).20
Russia asserts that South Ossetia and Abkhazia “have more grounds for recognition than Kosovo, both historically and
legally” (UN Doc. S/PV.5969, 2008, p. 17). Similarly, Transdniestria argues that its claim to self-determination is “both legally
and historically” in a better position than Kosovo (Bowring, 2014, p. 157). The latter unrecognised breakaway region also has
similarities with South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Crimea, because of the involvement of the Russian Federation. Although the
Russian Federation did not recognise Transdniestria, the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) in Ilaşcu and others v.
Moldova and Russia (2004, § 392) maintained that the entity was “set up in 1991–92 with the support of the Russian
Federation” and “remains under the effective authority, or at the very least under the decisive inﬂuence, of the Russian
Federation”.
Karabakh Armenians also refer to the right to self-determination of peoples and reject Azerbaijan – its parent state –
claims for the respect of the territorial integrity (UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/G/23, 2005; Declaration on State Independence of the
Nagorno Karabakh Republic, 1992). In the conﬂict of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as in other “frozen conﬂicts”, the military
involvement of a third party is evident. Armenia does not recognise Nagorno-Karabakh, though provided external direct and
indirect military support to the breakaway entity.21 Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic supported Crimea's choice
of joining the Russian Federation and referred to it as a form “of realisation of self-determination” (Armenia backs Crimea’s
right to self-determination, 2014; Karabakh Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Crimea, 2014).
To ascertain whether self-determination in the form of remedial secession might be applied in the post-Soviet “frozen
conﬂicts”, it is necessary to examine whether the conditions of remedial secession existed in South Ossetia, Abkhazia,
Transdniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh and Crimea.
The ﬁrst question to discuss is whether the populations of the “frozen conﬂicts” might be considered as “peoples”. In
Nagorno-Karabakh, Transdniestria and Crimea, minority groups that have their own “kin” states claim the right to self-
determination. Minorities do not have the right to self-determination, unless they have an identity by which they can be
distinguished from those living within its own “kin” state. There is no sufﬁcient evidence that Karabakh Armenians in
Nagorno-Karabakh22, Russians and Ukrainians in Transdniestria23 and Russians in Crimea24 have a collective individuality,
therefore, they cannot qualify as “peoples”.
As regards the Abkhazian people, they might possibly qualify as “peoples”, but they constitute a numerical minority in
Abkhazia25, whereas people that claim for self-determination have to constitute a majority in a particular territory. One
might argue that the number of inhabitants is not the main obstacle for the recognition of Abkhazia's right to remedial
secession (Dugard and Raič, 2006, p. 118), though it is hard to accept that the will of the minority may overrule the will of
the majority of the population.
The Ossetinian people seem to constitute a numerical majority (Regions and Territories: South Ossetia) in South Ossetia
and have their own distinct identity, which might theoretically qualify them as “peoples”. However, one of the main
obstacles to qualify all the groups in the “frozen conﬂicts” as the holders of the right to self-determination is the inﬂuence of
a third party on these self-purported states. Presently, it is especially difﬁcult to identify the groups claiming independence
and/or their genuine will. Russia signiﬁcantly supports the “state” building process in South Ossetia and Abkhazia26, and
Russia has been actively engaged in granting Russian citizenship to Abkhazian and Ossetian people (International Crisis
Group, 2006; p. 910). Furthermore, Russian military forces have been present in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which,
according to the Russian Federation, are merely peacekeeping forces (International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 78). Due to the
military presence of the Russian Federation, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are overwhelmingly dependent on Russian
ﬁnancial aid for their economy (International Crisis Group, 2013, p. 4‒5).27
The referendum in Crimea can neither be regarded as an exercise of self-determination of the people, as it was held
under the military presence of the Russian Federation (Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine by the High20 The statement of the United Kingdom in response to Russia's intervention in Georgia and the subsequent recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
See UN Doc. S/PV.5969, 2008, p. 12. Similarly, Iceland condemned Russia's involvement in Ukraine, maintaining that “[t]he use of military force to redraw
national boundaries is unacceptable and will have serious consequences for Russia’s international standing.” See UN Doc. A/68/PV.80, 2014, p. 12.
21 In its resolutions, for instance in resolution 853 (1993), the UN Security Council called upon the states “to refrain from supplying any weapons and
munitions”. In its resolution 884 (1993), the UN Security Council called upon the government of Armenia “to use its inﬂuence to achieve compliance by the
Armenians of the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic with resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993) and 874 (1993), and to ensure that the
forces involved are not provided with the means to extend their military campaign further”.
22 Since the beginning of the 1920s, Nagorno-Karabakhhas been populated largely by ethnic Armenians. The Armenian population constituted 94% of
the whole population 1921 and 75% in 1988. See in, for instance, Chaliand (1994), p. 11 and De Waal (2003), p. 8, 10.
23 According to a census carried out by Transdniestria's authorities in 2004, the population of Transdniestria is 555,347, of which Moldavians comprise
31.9% (177,000), Russians 30.4% (168,000), Ukrainians 28.8% (160,000) and others (mainly Bulgarians, Poles, Gagauz, Jews and Germans) 8.9%. See World
Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Transnistria (unrecognised state: Overview), 2007.
24 According to census data, in 2001 the population of Crimea was 1,916,000, of which Russians comprise 58.5% (1,180,400), Ukrainians 24.4% (492,200)
and Crimean Tartars 12.1% (243,400). See in Sasse, 2007, p. 275.
25 In 1992, Abkhazia was populated by Georgians 45%, Abkhaz 18% and Russians 16%. See Население Абхазии.
26 Professor D. Žalimas states that the main administration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is composed of the former security and military ofﬁcers of
Russia (Žalimas, 2008). Professor D. Žalimas is the head of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania and the director of the International and European Law
Institute of Vilnius University (Lithuania).
27 For the role of the Russian Federation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia also see, for instance, Žalimas, 2008.
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help of Russia and “survives by virtue of the military, economic, ﬁnancial and political support given to it by the Russian
Federation” (Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, 2004, § 392).
As to Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia participated in the events in Nagorno-Karabakh since the beginning of the conﬂict and
actively participated in the preparation of the plans to transfer Nagorno-Karabakh from the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenia
SSR (De Waal, 2003, p. 1522, p. 2024). Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh are also “heavily integrated ﬁnancially and
military” (Ajemian, 2011, p. 376‒377; Cheterian, 2012, p. 714) and the self-proclaimed entity is mostly dependent on the
support from Armenia. Furthermore, one can hardly talk about the self-determination of peoples in South Ossetia, Abkhazia
and Nagorno-Karabakh, as the territories were ethnically cleansed, thereby creating mono-ethnic territories.
Even if one admits that the groups in the “frozen conﬂicts” qualify as “peoples”28, it should be emphasised that “peoplehood”
does not per se signify the right to unilateral secession. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether the second condition for
remedial secession was met in the “frozen conﬂicts”. It seems hard to accept that there was a serious denial of internal self-
determination, followed by widespread, systematic and mass human rights violations towards South Ossetians, Abkhaz people,
Russians and Ukrainians in Transdniestria, and Russians in Crimea. As to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it would be difﬁcult to deny
that Georgia made human rights violations, particularly during the 1992‒1993 conﬂict and an armed conﬂict in 2008, though it
is documented that during the ﬁghting in the period of 1992‒1993, as well as during an armed conﬂict in 2008, both sides
committed atrocities.29 Moreover, the condition for the remedial right to secession may only exist after mass violence towards
the claimants of the right. In the cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both conﬂicts might be regarded as a result of secessionist
attempts, but not as the reason to secede. Prior to the conﬂicts, there was no evidence of such an amount of violations towards
the Abkhazians and Ossetians that it would have threatened the extermination of these groups.30 On the contrary, ethnic
Georgians were subjected to mass and disproportionate violence and expelled from their homes.31
The Russian Federation, while recognising the results of the referendum in Crimea and signing the treaty of the accession
of Crimea to the Federation inter alia mentioned widespread and systematic human rights violations towards the Russian
speaking population in Ukraine (Address by President of the Russian Federation, 2014), thereby invoking the remedial
secession arguments. On the contrary, as to the assertions of Russia, the Ukrainian government neither seriously denied the
internal self-determination of the people of Crimea nor there were widespread, systematic and gross human rights viola-
tions towards the Russian population in Crimea (Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine by the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights, 15 April 2014, 2014). The decision of the Parliament of Ukraine to abolish the 2012 Language Act
that extended the scope of the use of the regional languages, including Russian, cannot amount to such a level of oppression
that it could justify secession (p. 3, 16). Moreover, the former acting president of Ukraine vetoed the decision and it did not
come into force.
As to Nagorno-Karabakh, there was no systematic or serious denial of the internal right to self-determination. The
autonomy was abolished merely after the proclamation of the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh.32 One can hardly deny
that Azerbaijanis committed violent attacks on Karabakh Armenians33, though it is unlikely that the oppression towards this
group threatened the extermination of the Nagorno-Karabakh population and crossed the required threshold to justify
unilateral secession. The degree of violence hardly reached the atrocities committed towards the Kosovo Albanians, where
the oppression threatened the very existence of the people.
The third question to discuss is whether all effective, available and realistic remedies for the settlement of the “frozen
conﬂicts” have been exhausted. In the opinion of the authors, the question has to be answered in the negative. The third
condition of the remedial secession in the cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was unfulﬁlled, due to the consistent
rejection of Georgia's proposals for political and territorial autonomy.34 The absence of the third condition is also evident in
the case of Crimea. Therefore, it seems tenable to argue that the attempts by Russia to set up a legal case for the remedial
secession of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea have been met with failure, particularly given the fact that “o…4 it is
unlikely that the threshold of “extreme persecution” was genuinely reached” (Tancredi, 2008, p. 53). The independence of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia represents the creation of puppet states through the violation of international legal norms3528 For instance, Pieters argues that the population of Crimea might qualify as “peoples”. Pieters, 2014. B. Bowring writes about the distinct identity of
the inhabitants of Transdniestria. Bowring, 2014, p. 170171.
29 See, for instance, Human Rights Arms Project. Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of the Laws of War and Russia’s Role in the Conﬂict, Human Rights Arms
Project, 1995, p. 1; IIFFMCG Report, Volume II, p. 76‒77.
30 This approach is also supported, for instance, by Prof. Tancredi, J. Dugard and D. Raič. Tancredi, 2008, p. 53; Dugard and Raič, 2006, p. 118.
31 See, for instance, OSCE Istanbul Declaration, 1999, § 17; European Parliament Resolution on the Situation in Abkhazia of 1990; SC Resolution 869,
1994, § 12; SC Resolution 1036, 1996, § 7.
32 On 2 September 1992, Nagorno-Karabakh proclaimed an independent Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. On 26 November 1991, Azerbaijan abolished
the autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabakh.
33 For instance, “Operation Ring” is among well documented Azerbaijani attacks on Karabakh Armenians. Human Rights Watch described an operation
as an “unprecedented degree of violence and a systematic violation of human rights.” See Azerbaijan. Seven Years of Conﬂict in Nagorno-Karabakh, 1994, p. 5.
34 It is worth mentioning that during the 59th session of the UN General Assembly, the former president of Georgia, M. Saakashvili, talking about
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, ensured that Georgia is ready for “o…4 a global solution with global guarantees that would lead to the establishment of the
fullest and broadest form of autonomy – one that protects culture and language and guarantees self-governance, ﬁscal control and meaningful repre-
sentation and power sharing at the national government level”. UN Doc. A/59/PV.4, 2004, p. 14.
35 According to Prof. A. Tancredi, “o…4by extending Russian citizenship to the inhabitants of the two breakaway provinces, Russia aimed to
undermine the personal (and indirectly, territorial) basis of Georgia. By threatening the personality of another State, Russia has at least violated the duty
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mere example of illegal annexation by Russia.
It is worth noting that Russia and Crimea justify Crimea's independence relying on the ruling of the International Court of
Justice (‘ICJ’) that international law contains no prohibition on unilateral declarations (Accordance with International Law of
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, § 81). However, both of them do forget to mention that the
ICJ also emphasised that the illegality of unilateral declarations stems not from their unilateral character, but from the fact
that they were related to the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of the norms of international law, in
particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens) (§ 81).
From the perspective of the ICJ ruling, the independence of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Crimea was illegal, as it was
connected to the use of force and breach of the obligation not to intervene in the domestic affairs of another state. It allows
drawing the conclusion that the right to remedial secession cannot emanate from the use of force or other serious violations
of international law norms. If these violations are present, even effective territorial situations cannot be recognised as
having any legal effect. Similarly, Professor H. Hannum notes that “[m]ilitary force can establish control over a particular
territory, but it cannot create international legitimacy” (Hannum, 1998, p. 14).37 Therefore, the Advisory Opinion on Kosovo
rebuts the propositions of the Russian Federation and Crimea and reveals the illegality of the independence of Crimea.
In the cases of Nagorno-Karabakh and Trandniestria, no negotiations took place prior to the proclamation of indepen-
dence, as it was in the case of Kosovo. In the present negotiation process, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia reject the
proposals of autonomy (International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 6; Ochoa, 2014). The fact that the conﬂict has remained
unresolved for more than twenty years signiﬁes that the Minsk Group, the main mediator of the conﬂict, failed in acting as a
successful negotiator. In this sense, the participation of the Russian Federation, as a co-chair of the Minsk Group, raises
serious doubts, because Russian military forces have remained a strong presence in Armenia (De Waal, 2003, p. 261;
International Crisis Group, 2013, p. 4). Russia not only has strong interest in the South Caucasus, but also supplies arms to
both parties of the conﬂict (International Crisis Group, 2013, p. 2, 4, 9). Russia’s policy in the region is often described as
divide et impera (The Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis: A Blueprint for Resolution, 2000, p. 11). In this regard, the international
community should revise its negotiating strategy regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, particularly in mind of the fact that the
policy of the Russian Federation towards the conﬂict of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea,
is based on strategic geo-political interests, rather than good faith and the proper application of international law norms.
Transdniestria represents another conﬂict which has remained unresolved for more than twenty years. In the negotia-
tions over Transdniestria, Russia also played a pivotal role. Formally, the Russian Federation has always maintained that
Transdniestria should have a special status within Moldova (Bowring, 2014, p. 171), though facts deny this formal propo-
sition. As previously mentioned, the breakaway entity survives merely by virtue of the various kinds of support given by
Russia. Moreover, in 2013, Russia threatened that Moldova would lose Transdniestria if it continued moving towards the
European Union (Ivan, 2014, p. 1).38 Transdniestria, as well as Nagorno-Karabakh, demonstrates that bona ﬁde negotiations
between conﬂicting parties are simply not possible if the mediator has strong inﬂuence on the parties or does not respect
international law. In this sense, the situations of the “frozen conﬂicts” in the post-Soviet region add clarity to the procedural
criterion for the exercise of the negotiations. Negotiations in good faith are only possible if the conﬂicting parties are not
inﬂuenced by third states, which violates international law, including the principles of non-intervention in the internal
affairs of states and the prohibition of the use or threat of force.
Therefore, as regards the situation over the “frozen conﬂicts”, the international community must demonstrate that it will
not allow further escalation of the situation in the region and the trampling of international law norms (Ivan, 2014, p. 4).
Otherwise, the international community might face other irresistible misapplications of international law norms turned into
“just” facts.4. Conclusions1. The remedial right to secession has no relevance in the “frozen conﬂicts” of the post-Soviet region. South Ossetia,
Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transdniestria and Crimea cannot justify their independence on remedial secession. None
of the cases mentioned met the required conditions and their claim to independence was not recognised by the
international community.
2. The cases of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transdniestria and Crimea reveal that the right to remedial
secession is simply not relevant in cases which are related to the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of the(footnote continued)
not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of another State, in accordance with the UN Charter and the 1970 Friendly Relations
Declaration.” Tancredi, 2006, p. 52.
36 In the opinion of the authors, Chechnya and Tibet are two well-known examples of unrecognised legitimate claims for independence.
37 The professor referred to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem and other cases as examples.
38 The author also indicates that Russia has also imposed an embargo on Moldovan wine, but not Transdnistrian wine.
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a precondition for remedial secession.
Negotiations in good faith are only possible if the conﬂicting parties are not inﬂuenced by third states, which violates
international law, and while the mediation of the international community or third states is often necessary in the
negotiation process, the participation of states “violators” might be regarded as a decisive obstacle preventing bona ﬁde
negotiations.References
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